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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-The Sleeping Motorist
In the recent case of State v. Mundy,' the Supreme Court of North
Carolina for the first time considered the criminal liability of the sleep-
ing motorist.2  The defendant, a highway patrolman, went off duty
shortly before 4:00 a.m. after eighteen hours' continuous duty. Driving
home with two friends the defendant apparently went to sleep allowing
his car to run off the the highway into a parked auto. One of his guest
passengers was killed in the collision. The defendant was tried and
convicted of involuntary manslaughter.3 In reversing the conviction
for an erroneous charge, the Supreme Court stated its position in regard
to the criminal liability of the sleeping motorist, saying:
"... [The] mere fact that the operator of a motor vehicle
involuntarily goes to sleep while operating his automobile does
not, nothing else appearing, constitute culpable negligence. In
determining the question of culpable negligence, the focal point of
inquiry is whether the operator, because of drowsiness, previous
tiring activities, or other premonitory symptoms of sleep, be-
came aware of the likelihood of falling asleep, but nevertheless
continued to operate the vehicle under circumstances evincing a
thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference
to the rights and safety of others upon the highway, proximately
resulting in injury or death." 4
The inference from this case is that the court has adopted the test
of the majority of the courts in the United States that have considered
the question. The majority of the cases state that if the state only
proves the act of falling asleep while driving a motor vehicle, a nonsuit
' 243 N. C. 149, 90 S. E. 2d 312 (1955).2 The number of cases involving the sleeping motorist has constantly increased
since the invention of the automobile. During the years 1900 to 1919, there was
only one decision considering the liability of the sleeping motorist. However, this
number increased to 40 cases from 1940 to 1949. Kaufman and Kantrowitz, The
Case of the Sleeping Motorist, 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. (1950). In 1948, approxi-
mately 4 per cent of the deaths resulting from automobile accidents throughout
the United States were attributed to the driver falling asleep or becoming un-
conscious. ACCIDE NT FACTS (National Safety Council 1948). In North Carolina
during 1955, the sleeping motorist was involved in slightly more than 3 per cent
of the fatal accidents, or 32 fatal accidents and 651 accidents. NoaRT CAROLINA
ANNUAL MOTOR VEHIcLE ACCIDENT SUMMARY (1955).
'The court in State v. Whaley, 191 N. C. 387, 389, 132 S. E. 6, 8 (1926) said,
"The degree of negligence necessary to be shown on an indictment for man-
slaughter, where an unintentional killing is established, is such recklessess or care-
lessness as is incompatible with a proper regard for human life. A want of due
care or a failure to observe the rule of the prudent man, which proximately pro-
duces an injury will render one liable for damages in a civil action, while culpable
negligence, under the criminal law, is such recklessness or carelessness, resulting in
injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless
indifference to the safety and rights of others."
' State v. Mundy, 243 N. C. 149, 153, 90 S. E. 2d 312, 315 (1955).
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for defendant would be proper. Therefore, a driver who while asleep
has driven his automobile so as to kill someone is not guilty of negligent
homicide unless he had such warning of falling asleep that under all
the circumstances he drove recklessly or in marked disregard of the
safety of others and such driving was the proximate cause of the death.
However in State v. Olsen,6 the Utah Supreme Court took a con-
trary view. In this case the court held that the fact of going to sleep
while driving an automobile, without more, at least presents a question
for the jury as to whether the driver was negligent and that the jury
could find that the defendant, in allowing himself to go to sleep, was
guilty of negligence manifesting a marked disregard for the safety of
others on the highway. The significance of this case is that upon the
state proving that the defendant went to sleep, the defendant must come
forward with evidence to show that he did not have any prior warning
of going to sleep or else take the chance that the jury may find him
guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter in North Carolina is based on culpable
negligence, which is such conduct that evinces a thoughtless disregard
of consequences or a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of
others.7 Although the above rule is not controlling in civil actions, it
may aid the treatment of this problem to see how the courts have treated
the sleeping motorists in civil cases involving negligence.
The cases of Baird v. Baird8 and Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co.9
seem to give a good indication of the civil liability of the sleeping motor-
ist in actions based on ordinary negligence in North Carolina. The
cases indicate that the Supreme Court of North Carolina will adopt the
majority rule in the United States. The majority rule is that if in an
action based on ordinary negligence, the plaintiff proves that the de-
fendant went to sleep while driving, that fact alone justifies an infer-
ence of ordinary negligence sufficient to make out a prima facie case
and make it a question for the jury.10
In Baird v. Baird the court applying the law of New York, because
the accident occurred there, could find no New York case dealing with
this question but found the applicable law in a case dealing with a sleep-
ing passenger. The court said:
'Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671 (1941) ; People v. Robinson, 253
Mich. 507, 235 N. W. 236 (1931) ; Novesky v. Mac Duff, Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 280 App. Div. 953, 116 N. Y. S. 330 (1952) ; State v. Champ, 172 Kan.737, 242 P. 2d 1070 (1952) ; In re Lewis, 11 N. J. 217, 94 A. 2d 328 (1952).
0 State v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, 160 P. 2d 427 (1945).
See note 3 supra.
8223 N. C. 730, 28 S. E. 2d 225 (1943).
S225 N. C. 323, 34 S. E. 2d 211 (1945).
"0 See Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925) ; which is ap-
parently the leading case in the United States on civil liability of the sleeping
motorist. See also 28 A. L. R. 2d 1, 45 (1953).
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
"Ordinarily, one cannot go to sleep while driving an auto-
mobile without having relaxed the vigilance which the law re-
quires, and it lies within his own control to keep awake or to cease
from driving, and so the mere fact of his going to sleep while
driving is a proper basis for an inference of negligence sufficient
to make out a prima facie case against him for injuries sustained
by another while so driving and sufficient for a recovery if no
circumstances tending to excuse or justify his conduct are
proven."' 1
Although this statement was dictum in the case and the court expressly
said that this decision would not be binding upon later cases in North
Carolina, it seems to be a sound inference that the court would adopt
such a rule when faced with a case involving the liability of the sleeping
motorist based on ordinary negligence.
This inference is strengthened by the case of Hobbs v. Queens City
Coach Co. where the driver of a bus ran out of his lane of traffic thereby
running into the automobile of the plaintiff who was in his proper lane.
After the accident the driver remarked that he must have fallen asleep.
Although the court made no direct statement that sleeping while driving
a motor vehicle was negligence, it did say that it wis a general rule of
law that operators of a motor vehicle must exercise the care which an
ordinary prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.
The court went farther to say that in the exercise of such duty it is
incumbent upon the operator to be reasonably vigilant. Although the
court did not speak the word "sleep" in this statement, its relationship
to vigilance will be clarified by referring to the statement in Baird v.
Baird, where the court said that ordinarily one cannot go to sleep while
driving an automobile without having relaxed the vigilance which the law
requires. Therefore it is a logical inference that the court in speaking of
the operator having a duty to be reasonably vigilant, meant that a person
has a duty to keep awake while driving a motor vehicle and proof that
he went to sleep is an inference of negligence without showing more.
The court in Baird v. Baird, explains the rationale of this rule by
saying:
"The approach of sleep, 'tired nature's sweet restorer,' is usu-
ally indicated by certain premonitory symptoms, and does not
come upon one unheralded. His negligence, if any, lies in the fact
that he does not heed the indications of its approach or the circum-
stances which are likely to bring it about."' 
2
"'Baird v. Baird, 223 N. C. 730, 732, 28 S. E. 2d 225, 227 (1943).
1 Id. at 732, 28 S. E. 2d at 227.
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In view of this the test would seem to be whether the defendant was
negligent in permitting himself to fall asleep in the first place. This
logic would be in accord with the reasoning of the well-settled rule
that one who is involved in a collision due to sudden paralysis or un-
expected epileptic seizure is not negligent.13 It would follow that one
overcome by sleep without warning could not be said to be negligent,
but it should be up to him to prove that he did not have any warning. 14
Some of the most frequent circumstances said to impute warning of
sleep by other states are: (1) lack of sleep; (2) length of time at the
wheel; (3) presence of premonitory symptoms (frequent yawning,
drowsiness, prior napping); and (4) driving under the influence of
liquor.15
North Carolina is not concerned with different degrees of negligence
as are other states with guest statutes. However, in Farf our v. Fahad,16
our court, interpreting the law of Virginia which requires gross neg-
ligence, followed the majority rule as to gross negligence. It held that
the mere falling asleep while driving does not give rise to an inference
of gross negligence necessary to make a prima facie case.17 The majority
of cases requiring a finding of wilful and wanton negligence apparently
apply the same rule.'8 The court unaminously agreed that the driver of
an automobile who falls asleep while driving is grossly negligent if he
had some prior warning of the likelihood of his going to sleep. There-
fore, if the plaintiff in an action based on gross or wilful and wanton
negligence shows merely that the operator of the motor vehicle fell
asleep while driving, a directed verdict for the defendant is proper. Most
of the cases of the sleeping motorist involving gross and wilful and
wanton negligence come up in states having guest 0 statutes which re-
quire gross or wilful and wanton negligence for liability.20
1 1 VARTANIAN, THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES IN NORTH CAROLINA, 85 (3d ed.
1947). Also see Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925) for the
medical basis for the rule.
1 In forecasting what the Supreme Court of North Carolina will do in cases
involving civil liability of the sleeping motorist in actions based on ordinary
negligence, it is interesting to note that no case has been found in which the
operator of a motor vehicle who fell asleep has been absolved of liability in an
action based on ordinary negligence, unless there were other circumstances to
relieve the defendant of liability. 5 Am. JuR., AUTOMOBILES § 180 (1956 Supp.).13See 28 A. L. R. 2d 1 §§ 26, 27, 28, 29 (1953).
10214 N. C. 281, 199 S. E. 521 (1938).17Id. at 287.
18 For example, see Covington v. Carley, 197 Miss. 535, 19 So. 2ct 817 (1947)
applying the law of Alabama; Phillips v. Harper, 60 Cal. App. 2d 298, 140 P. 2d
686 (1943); Secrist v. Raffleson, 326 Ill. App. 489, 62 N. E. 2d 399 (1941);
Butine v. Stevens, 319 Mich. 176, 29 N. W. 2d 325 (1947).
19 A "Guest" in an automobile is one who takes ride in automobile driven by
another person, merely for his own pleasure or on his own business, and without
making any return or conferring any benefit to the automobile driver. BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
20 Statutes which relieve the owner or operator of a motor vehicle of liability
for injury to a guest unless he has been grossly negligent or wilful or intentional
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Continuing to drive under the following conditions which resulted
in falling asleep have justified a finding of gross or wilful and wanton
negligence; (1) drinking of intoxicating beverages; (2) prior warning,
refusal of relief; (3) excessive length of time at the wheel; and (4)
statutes limiting driving time.2 '
While the threat of civil liability serves as a deterrent to drivers
falling asleep while driving, a look at accident statistics indicates that
more extreme measures should be taken. Since the Supreme Court
of North Carolina apparently has adopted the rule as set out in State
v. Mundy regarding criminal liability, this writer would like to see
the legislature pass a statute similar to a recent Michigan statute.22
Although this statute does not speak expressly of sleeping at the wheel,
it does make negligence of a lesser degree than wilful and wanton, re-
sulting in death, a misdemeanor. Thus, if the rationale inferred in
Baird v. Baird and Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co. is followed, the state
could get a conviction under this statute by proving the fact of falling
asleep alone without more. Such a measure should have some effect
in reducing highway fatalities.
PARKS ALLEN ROBERTS
Descent and Distribution-The Right of a Prospective Heir to Release
or Assign an Expectancy
During his lifetime, deceased entered into an agreement with four
of his eight children whereby in consideration of $6,000.00 paid to each
of them by him they released all interest and right of inheritance in his
estate. After the death of the deceased, the administrator of the estate
brought an action in which he sought to have the court rule upon the
legal effect of the instrument purporting to be a release. The North
Carolina Supreme Court unanimously held that the release was binding
and enforceable in equity if fairly made upon a valuable consideration
misconduct have been enacted in many states. These are commonly denominated
"guest" statutes. Certain things may amount to gross negligence or wilful and
wanton misconduct within the meaning of the guest statutes. Whether or not
there is such negligence as the statute requires is ordinarily a question for thejury. With its conclusion the courts do not ordinarily interfere. 5 AM.-JUR.,
Automobiles, 237, 240 (1933). Also see cases cited note 18 supra.
21 For example, see Belletete v. Morin, 322 Mass. 214, 76 N. E. 2d 660 (1948)
Oast v. Mopper, 58 Ga. App. 566, 199 S. E. 249 (1938) ; Smith v. Williams, 180
Ore. 232, 178 P. 2d 710 (1947) ; Masters v. Cardi, 186 Va. 261, 42 S. E. 2d 203
(1947).
"g MicH. STAT. ANN. c. 286a, § 28.556 (1954), which reads: "Any person who,
by the operation of any vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless,
feckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death
of another, shall be guilty of a [misdemeanor] punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison not more than two years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00..
Also see 49 Cal. Code, Penal § 500 (1956) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. § 8-529 (1947).
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